Abstract
Introduction
It is generally accepted that corporate boards participate a fundamental role in corporate governance, the structure of the strategic dimensions of the company and originate goals (Agyemang et al., 2014) . However, there is no consensus as to what the optimal board structure should be (Agyemang and Castellini, 2013) . There is fluid controversy on whether the board should be composed mainly of "inside" or "outside" directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008) . The agency theorist argues that board independence is essential if it is monitored effectively by management team, and insider-dominated boards, by their very nature, are not independent of the management (Heravia et al., 2011) . Besides, steward theorist argues that inside directors are more effective because they have better knowledge of the company and industry than outside directors and they are just as diligent as non-executive directors, given their legal responsibility and their own vested interest in the firm (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Zhang and Wang, 2013) .
